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Abstract Biscuit conditionals such as If you are thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge are
felt to be different from canonical conditionals If it’s raining, the fireworks will be
cancelled in that the consequent seems to be entailed regardless of the truth/falsity of
the antecedent. Franke (2009) argues that the “feeling of the consequent entailment”
in biscuit conditionals is due to the conditional independence between the antecedent
and consequent; thus a uniform semantics for canonical and biscuit conditionals
can be maintained. A question arises as to whether it is possible to derive the same
consequent entailment in the framework of dynamic semantics. Furthermore, there
are some instances of biscuit conditional questions such as If I get thirsty, is there
anything in the fridge? This paper provides a dynamic and non-symmetric version
of the independence condition, a d-independence condition which correctly derives
the consequent entailment in both declaratives and interrogatives.
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1 Introduction
Biscuit conditionals such as (1) are felt to be different from canonical conditionals
as in (2) in that the consequent seems to be entailed regardless of the truth of the
antecedent.
(1) Biscuit Conditional
a. If you are thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge.
ENTAILS
There’s beer in the fridge.
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b. There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.
ENTAILS
There are biscuits on the sideboard.
(2) Canonical Conditional
If it’s raining, the fireworks will be cancelled.
DOESN’T ENTAIL
The fireworks will be cancelled.
In other words, biscuit conditionals do not give rise to ‘conditional’ meanings.
As noted by Iatridou (1991: 51), the if -clauses in canonical conditionals restrict the
situations where the consequent is true, while those in biscuit conditionals restrict
the situations where “the consequent is relevant (in a vague sense, also subsuming
circumstances of social appropriateness).”
Given this difference, various scholars attempted to propose a special semantics
for biscuit conditionals. For instance, Siegel (2006) proposes that a biscuit condi-
tional construction gives rise to existential quantification over potential literal acts.
Simply put, (1a) is paraphrased as in (3).
(3) If you’re thirsty, there is a (relevant/salient) assertion that there’s beer in the
fridge.
There are a number of problems in this approach. In particular, Siegel’s para-
phrase asserts a mere presentation of relevant potential act, which is too weak. The
point might be clearer with a biscuit conditional question like (4). In uttering (4),
the speaker is waiting for the addressee’s answer, thus performing an actual question
act rather than merely presenting a relevant possible act as in (5).
(4) If I get thirsty, is there beer in the fridge?
(5) If I get thirsty, there is a relevant question: Is there beer in the fridge?
Franke (2009), on the other hand, argues that no special semantics for biscuit
conditionals are necessary. The conditional independence derives the consequent
entailment of biscuit conditionals. Assuming that Franke (2009) is correct, a question
arises as to whether it is possible to derive the same consequent entailment in the
framework of dynamic semantics. Furthermore, there are some instances of biscuit
conditional questions, as in (4).
Intuitively, a biscuit conditional question does give rise to a consequent en-
tailment. In (4), answering ‘yes’ entails that there is something in the fridge and
answering ‘no’ entails the opposite regardless of the state of the speaker’s thirst.
Put another way, if the speaker asks the unconditionalized counterpart right after
the conditionalized one, it would be a superfluous question. In contrast, canonical
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conditional questions do not. I.e., answering ‘yes’ to (6) does not enlighten the
questioner on whether the fireworks will be cancelled or not when it is not raining.
(6) If it’s raining, will the fireworks be cancelled?
DOESN’T ENTAIL
Will the fireworks be cancelled?
This paper provides a dynamic and non-symmetric version of the indepen-
dence condition, a d-independence condition which correctly derives the consequent
entailment in both declaratives and interrogatives.1
We would like to note that this paper does not attempt to specify a sufficient
condition for the biscuit conditional. That is, we do not argue that independence
alone gives us a felicitous biscuit conditional. For instance, although it is a reasonable
assumption that the antecedent and consequent in (7) are independent, the whole
conditional is not a felicitous biscuit conditional.
(7) #If France is hexagonal, there’s a beer in the fridge.
Thus, independence is one of the necessary conditions for the biscuit conditional
interpretation but not a sufficient condition. In order to be a felicitous biscuit
conditional, the information encoded in the antecedent must be relevant to the
information encoded in the consequent. Note also that there are arguably a lot of
ways to come up with a context which makes the antecedent and consequent in (7)
relevant. In those cases, (7) might be judged as a felicitous biscuit conditional. We
refer the interested reader to Franke 2007, 2009 for the discourse functions of biscuit
conditionals.
This paper is structured as follows: First, we review Franke’s (2007, 2009)
definition of independence and his analysis of biscuit conditionals in static semantics
in section 2. Crucially, the independence assumption enables us to have a uniform
semantics for both canonical and biscuit conditionals. Section 3.1 motivates the
dynamic extension. Dynamic semantics is suitable for analyzing biscuit conditionals
since intuitively the antecedent of a biscuit conditional sets up a context for the
subsequent update, i.e., assertion or question. Section 3.2 then introduces our def-
inition of d-independence, and show how it derives the consequent entailment in
Kaufmann’s (2000) dynamic framework. In section 4, we turn to the analysis of
biscuit conditional questions like (4) by further extending the notion of independence
to a structured context (Groenendijk 1999). In particular, we adopt Isaacs and Rawl-
ins’ (2008) analysis of conditional questions which combines Kaufmann’s (2000)
stack-based model of conditionals and Groenendijk’s (1999) theory of interrogatives.
Together with our d-independence condition, the consequent entailment of a biscuit
conditional question is successfully derived. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1 Incidentally, van Rooij (2007) mentions a condition equivalent to our d-independence. See Remark 6.
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2 Independence and biscuit conditionals and in static semantics
Franke (2009) argues that the “feeling of the consequent entailment” in biscuit
conditionals is due to the conditional independence between the antecedent and
consequent; thus a uniform semantics (i.e., a strict implication) for canonical and
biscuit conditionals can be maintained.2
Let us go back to the biscuit conditionals and conditional independence. Given
a set W of possible worlds, we regard a set σ ⊆W as the speaker’s epistemic
state. Let P,Q⊆W be propositions. We denote the complement of P over W by P.
Following Franke (2009), we introduce the following definitions.
(8) a. The speaker knows the proposition P (2P, in short) in σ if σ ⊆ P.
b. P is consistent (3P, in short) in σ if σ ∩P 6= /0.
c. ‘if P then Q’ holds in σ if σ ∩P⊆ Q.
Note that the semantics of implication above is identical to that of strict implica-
tion. Franke (2009) shows that the consequent entailment 2Q follows from a strict
implication ‘if P then Q’, together with the following independence assumption.
Definition 1. Let σ ⊆W be an epistemic state and P,Q⊆W propositions. We say
that P and Q are independent in σ if
3X and 3Y in σ imply 3(X ∩Y ) in σ ,
for all X ∈ {P,P} and Y ∈ {Q,Q}.
Let us take Figure 1 for illustration, where p and q are the syntactic expressions
of sets P and Q, respectively. We define our set of possible worlds as all the truth
functions from { p,q} to the set {0,1} of truth values. Each circle in Figure 1
represents a world and orange ellipses represent an information state σi (i = 1 or 2).
In the current setting, our W only contains four worlds. The world w11, for instance,
represents a truth function sending both p and q to 1 and the world w10 is a truth
function sending p to 1 and q to 0. We can show that P and Q are independent in σ1
2 As noted by van Rooij (2007) and Franke (2009), the notion of independence is deployed in various
areas. Let us take a brief look at some of them. The first one is logical independence. Given an
axiom system S, a proposition A is independent of S if neither A nor ¬A is derivable from S. The
second one is probabilistic independence. Given a provability function P, we say that a proposition A
is probabilistically independent from a proposition B if P(A∧B) = P(A) ·P(B), or equivalently, if
P(A) 6= 0, then P(B|A) = P(B). Third, Lewis (1988) defines the notion of orthogonality of subject
matter (i.e., questions/issues): For a context σ (a set of possible worlds): Two issues (i.e., equivalence
relations on σ ) C1 and C2 are independent/orthogonal in σ iff, for all w,v ∈ σ , there exists u ∈ σ
such that 〈u,w〉 ∈C1 and 〈u,v〉 ∈C2. Our notion of independence in dynamic semantics is similar to
the second definition of probabilistic independence: P(A) 6= 0, then P(B|A) = P(B).
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(i) p and q are independent in σ1 (ii) p and q are not independent in σ2
Figure 1 (In)dependence in static semantics
in Figure 1 (i) as follows: First, as for the case where X = P and Y = Q, we have
both 3P and 3Q in σ1 and 3(P∩Q) in σ1. Second, when X = P and Y = Q, we
also have both3P and3Q in σ1 and3(P∩Q) in σ1. Finally, as for the cases where
Y = Q, Q is not consistent in σ1, thus the antecedent in Definition 1 is trivially met.
In contrast, P and Q are not independent in σ2 of Figure 1 (ii), since 3P and 3Q in
σ2 but P∩Q is not consistent in σ2.
We can characterize the notion of independence in terms of 2 as follows.
Proposition 2. Let σ ⊆W be an epistemic state and P,Q⊆W propositions. Then,
the following are equivalent:
(i) P and Q are independent in σ ,
(ii) if X is consistent in σ , then
2Y in σ is equivalent to 2Y in σ ∩X ,
for all X ∈ {P,P} and Y ∈ {Q,Q}.
Proof. (i) is equivalent to the following: if X is consistent in σ ,3Y in σ is equivalent
to 3Y in σ ∩X , for all X ∈ {P,P} and Y ∈ {Q,Q}. Moreover, this is equivalent to
the following: if X is consistent in σ , 2Y in σ is equivalent to 2Y in σ ∩X , for all
X ∈ {P,P} and Y ∈ {Q,Q}. Then, it is easy to see that this is equivalent to (ii).
Now let us derive the consequent entailment from the conditional independent
assumption.
Proposition 3 (Franke 2009). Let σ ⊆ W be an epistemic state and P,Q ⊆ W
propositions. Suppose that P and Q are independent in σ and that P is consistent in
σ . Then, ‘if P then Q’ in σ implies 2Q in σ .
Briefly, if the antecedent of a conditional is presupposed to be possible (3P in
σ ) and the speaker has a prior knowledge that the antecedent P and the consequent
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Q are independent (Definition 1), it follows from σ ∩P⊆ Q that the speaker knows
Q, hence the entailment of the consequent obtains.
Proof. Assume that ‘if P then Q’ in σ , i.e., σ ∩P ⊆ Q hence 2Q in σ ∩P. By
assumption and Proposition 2, we obtain 2Q in σ , as desired.
In short, a strict implication with the independence assumption gives us the
consequent entailment. Thus, a uniform semantics, i.e., strict implication, for
canonical and biscuit conditionals can be maintained and no special semantics for
biscuit conditionals is necessary.
3 Dynamic extension
3.1 Why dynamic?
The previous section summarized Franke’s (2009) static analysis that derives the
consequent entailment of biscuit conditionals. This paper extends the same idea to
dynamic framework. In particular, we adopt procedural/suppositional semantics of
conditionals. Within the dynamic view, conditionals are characterized as a two-step
(Stalnaker 1968; Karttunen 1974; Heim 1982) or three-step (Kaufmann 2000; Isaacs
& Rawlins 2008) update procedure:
(i) A temporary state is created by updating the information state with the
antecedent of the conditional.
(ii) The derived state is updated with the consequent.
(iii) The original context learns the effects of the second step.
It is unclear if there is any motivation/advantage of the dynamic approach. There
are two clear advantages to this approach. First, as Franke (2007) notes, one of the
discourse functions of a biscuit conditional is that its antecedent shifts the context so
that the subsequent assertion becomes optimal. For instance, in (1a), the consequent
clause there’s beer in the fridge “is possibly irrelevant, infelicitous or in some other
sense non-optimal” (Franke 2007: 96) in the original unmodified context. Thus,
the antecedent clause if you’re thirsty shifts the context so that the consequent can
be felicitously uttered. The dynamic approach of conditionals fits this intuition.
Stalnaker (1968) summarizes the step-wise semantics of conditionals, which is
coined “the Ramsey test”:
“First add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs;
second, make whatever adjustments are required to maintain con-
sistency (without modifying the belief in the antecedent); finally,
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consider whether or not the consequent is then true.” (Stalnaker
1968: 102)
Second, as argued by Isaacs & Rawlins (2008), a dynamic semantics of condi-
tionals is suitable for accounting conditional questions. One of the main goals of this
paper is to account for the consequent entailment of biscuit conditional questions
without stipulating special semantics for them. Conditional questions can also have
procedural/suppositional semantics as noted by Ramsey (1931):
“If two people are arguing ‘If p, will q?’ and are both in doubt as to
p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and
arguing on that basis about q ...” (Ramsey 1931: 247)
Isaacs & Rawlins (2008) argue for this dynamic and suppositional theory of
conditionals and develop the formal apparatus as detailed in section 4 of this paper.
In particular, Isaacs & Rawlins (2008) argue against Velissaratou’s (2000) static
logic of conditional questions, which regards denial of the antecedent like (9b) as a
partial answer to the conditional question.
(9) a. If Alfonso comes to the party, will Joanna leave?
b. Alfonso isn’t coming to the party. (Isaacs & Rawlins 2008)
According to Isaacs & Rawlins (2008), Velissaratou’s (2000) approach is unde-
sirable in both empirical and conceptual senses. Empirically, denial of the antecedent
does not answer the question but only dispels the issue. Conceptually, including
denial of the antecedent as an answer to the question results in abandoning the
mutual exclusivity property of questionhood (Hamblin 1958). See Isaacs & Rawlins
2008 for more detailed discussions.
Also, we note that the dynamic turn makes a difference with the semantics of
might (see Remark 7 and Footnote 6 below).
3.2 Independence and biscuit conditionals in dynamic semantics
In the current paper, we follow Kaufmann’s (2000) formulation of dynamic seman-
tics. First, we regard a mapping from a countable set P of proposition letters to
{0,1} as a possible world, define W := {0,1}P as the set of all possible worlds and
say that σ ⊆W is an information state. We assume that our syntaxML consists of
the negation ¬, the conjunction ∧, the implication→, and the diamond operator 3
(‘might’ as a test, for more details, see Remark 7 below), as well as P. The formulas
inML are defined inductively as usual. Then, we define the result of updating σ
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with a formula ϕ ∈ML as follows:
σ [p] = {w ∈ σ |w(p) = 1} ,
σ [ϕ ∧ψ] = σ [ϕ][ψ],
σ [¬ϕ] = σ \σ [ϕ],
σ [ϕ → ψ] = {w ∈ σ |w ∈ σ [ϕ] implies w ∈ σ [ϕ][ψ]} ,
σ [3ϕ] = {w ∈ σ |σ [ϕ] 6= /0} .
In characterizing the intuition of entailment, we use the notion of support (acceptance
in Veltman 1996) and consistency in an information state:
(10) ϕ is supported in σ (notation: σ |= ϕ) if σ [ϕ] = σ .
(11) ϕ is consistent in σ if σ [ϕ] 6= /0.
In Kaufmann 2000, note that we obtain the monotonicity of the updates in the
following sense:3
Proposition 4. σ [ϕ]⊆ σ for all information states σ and all formulas ϕ .
We define the non-symmetric d-independent condition as in Definition 5. Intu-
itively speaking, ψ is independent of ϕ in σ if updating σ with ϕ or ¬ϕ does not
affect the consistency of ψ .
Definition 5. ψ is d-independent of ϕ in σ if, given X’s consistency in σ ,
σ [Y ] 6= /0 is equivalent to σ [X ][Y ] 6= /0,
for all X ∈ {ϕ,¬ϕ } and all Y ∈ {ψ,¬ψ }.
Remark 6. Van Rooij (2007) defines a similar yet different notion of independence
which follows Lewis’s (1988) idea of orthogonality, as follows: We say that ϕ and
ψ are independent in σ if the partitions {σ [ϕ],σ [¬ϕ]} and {σ [ψ],σ [¬ψ]} are
orthogonal, i.e., for all X ∈ {σ [ϕ],σ [¬ϕ]} and Y ∈ {σ [ψ],σ [¬ψ]}, X ∩Y 6= /0.
Note that this definition is symmetrically defined for ϕ and ψ . Van Rooij (2007)
also mentions a condition, his Lemma 4.3 (independence), which is equivalent to
3 One of the differences between Kaufmann (2000) and Veltman (1996) lies in the semantics for 3ϕ .
If we follow the semantics of 3ϕ in Kaufmann 2000, all the updates are monotone: σ [ϕ]⊆ σ for all
σ and ϕ . In Veltman 1996, however, we have the following semantics for 3ϕ:
σ [3ϕ] = {w ∈W |σ [ϕ] 6= /0} .
As a result, all the updates need not to be monotone. In this sense, 3 does not maintain monotonicity
in updates in Veltman 1996. Note that monotonicity of updates are essential in characterizing the
independence and consequent entailment of biscuit conditionals.
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our Definition 5. However, van Rooij’s syntax does not include the test modality 3.
Thus, once we include 3 in the syntax, the two versions are no longer equivalent.
For more details, see Footnote 5.
(12) a. q is d-independent of p in σ1 of Figure 1 (i). This is shown as follows.
First, let X be p. When Y is ¬q, we obtain that ¬q is inconsistent in both
σ1 and σ1[p]. When Y is q, σ1[q] = {w11,w01 } and σ1[p][q] = {w11 }, and
so q is consistent in both σ1 and σ1[p]. Second, let X be ¬p. Similarly to
the first case, when Y is ¬q, we obtain that ¬q is inconsistent in both σ1
and σ1[p].When Y is q, σ1[q] = {w11,w01 } and σ1[¬p][q] = {w01 }, and
so q is consistent in both σ1 and σ1[p].
b. q is not d-independent of p in σ2 of Figure 1 (ii). Take ¬p as X and q as Y
in Definition 5. Clearly, ¬p is consistent in σ2 because σ2[¬p] = {w00 } =
6= /0. On the other hand, σ2[q] = {w11 } 6= /0 but σ2[¬p][q] = /0.
c. 3p is not d-independent of p in σ2 of Figure 1 (ii). To see this, take ¬p as
X and 3p as Y in Definition 5. As in the previous item, ¬p is consistent in
σ2. Then, σ2[3p] = σ2 6= /0 while σ2[¬p][3p] = /0.
d. p is d-independent of 3p in σ2 of Figure 1 (ii). When we take ¬3p as
X , σ2[¬3p] = /0, and so, we can focus on the case where X is 3p. Now,
σ2[3p] = σ2 6= /0. For any Y ∈ { p,¬p}, thus, we obtain Y ’s consistency
in σ2 hence Y ’s consistency in σ2[3p] .
As (12c) and (12d) show, our independence condition is non-symmetric, i.e., only
defines the consequent’s independence from the antecedent, since in the current
analysis, a conditional is treated as a procedural update.4 This non-symmetry is
particularly suitable for the biscuit conditional questions discussed below, as the
antecedent assertion sets up a context on which the consequent question operate. Van
Rooij (2007) also offers a notion of independence in context in a dynamic setting to
account for the strengthening of conditional presuppositions, but it is symmetrically
defined (van Rooij 2007: Definition 4.2).5
Remark 7. As noted above in section 3.1, the treatment of might is one of the
crucial differences between static and dynamic semantics. In static semantics, might
is defined as existential quantification over possible worlds (e.g., Kratzer 1981,
1991). In dynamic semantics, might p (denoted by 3p in our syntax) is a test on σ
4 In (12), note that we can also show p is d-independent of q in both σ1 and σ2. Therefore, our notion
of d-independence is symmetric for p and q.
5 As we have seen in (12), 3 is the source of non-symmetry of d-independence in our case. In
particular, it is easy to see that 3p and p are not independent in σ2 of Figure 1 by van Rooij’s (2007)
definition (see Remark 6), while p is d-independent of 3p in σ2.
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as defined above, thus it does not bring any new information on σ . Veltman (1996)
argues that this dynamic semantics of might is also one of the advantages over the
static one since it captures the difference in the following pair:
(13) a. Somebody is knocking at the door (p1) . . . Maybe it’s John (3p2) . . .
It’s Mary (p3).
b. # Somebody is knocking at the door (p1) . . . Maybe it’s John (3p2) . . .
It’s Mary (p3) . . . Maybe it’s John (3p2). (adapted from Veltman 1996:
223)
In (13a), the speaker’s presumption is conceivably overridden by the learned fact.
Since 3p2 is a mere test, σ [p1][3p2] = σ [p1], if p2 is consistent in σ [p1]. Thus,
σ [p1][3p2][p3] does not lead to an absurd state, if p3 is consistent in σ [p1][3p2].
In (13b), on the other hand, the speaker cannot come up with a new assumption
which overrides the established fact. Once σ [p1][3p2] is updated with p3, p2
is no longer consistent (assuming only one person can knock at the door), thus
σ [p1][3p2][p3][3p2] results in an absurd state.6
Going back to the definition of d-independence, since the negation is defined as
σ [¬ϕ] = σ \σ [ϕ], a simple calculation shows that σ [¬ϕ] = /0 iff σ [ϕ] = σ . With the
help of this equivalence, we can rewrite the d-independence in terms of the notion
of support as follows.
Proposition 8. ψ is d-independent of ϕ in σ iff, given X’s consistency in σ ,
σ |= Y is equivalent to σ [X ] |= Y ,
for all X ∈ {ϕ,¬ϕ } and all Y ∈ {ψ,¬ψ }.
6 Since the interest of the current paper lies in conditionals, the reader might wonder what the dynamic
approach predicts for the conditional sentences which contain p and 3p. According to (12c) and
(12d), 3p is not d-independent of p while p is d-independent of 3p. Thus, we predict that p→3p
does not entail p, while 3p→ p entails p. We believe that this prediction is correct, although the
judgment of the natural language constructions turns out to be somehow more intriguing as in (i).
(i) a. # If it’s raining, it might be raining.
b. If it might be raining, it’s raining.
If the independence were the sufficient condition for biscuit conditionals, (ia) would be a canonical
conditional, while (ib) would be a biscuit conditional. However, the contrast of felicity in (i) does not
seem to come from their biscuit-conditional-ness. As noted in section 1, independence alone does not
yield a biscuit conditional. We speculate that the anomaly of (ia) is similar to Veltman’s (13b). The
antecedent creates a hypothetical context where ‘it’s raining’ is already a fact. It does not make sense
to weaken the established fact with might. Also, it is not clear whether (ib) is a biscuit conditional
even though it entails the consequent. Our speculation is that a conditional construction is understood
as a biscuit conditional when the antecedent serves as an optimizer for the subsequent speech act
(Franke 2007).
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Finally, we obtain the following theorem that derives the consequent entail-
ment of biscuit conditionals. Assume that the consequent is d-independent of the
antecedent and the antecedent is presupposed to be consistent. Then, when the
implication is supported, the consequent alone is also supported:
Theorem 1. Let ψ be d-independent of ϕ in σ and assume that ϕ is consistent in
σ . Then, σ |= ϕ → ψ implies σ |= ψ .
Proof. Assume σ [ϕ] 6= /0 and σ |= ϕ → ψ . By Proposition 8, it suffices to show
σ [ϕ][ψ] = σ [ϕ], i.e., σ [ϕ] ⊆ σ [ϕ][ψ] by monotonicity. Fix any w ∈ σ [ϕ]. Since
σ [ϕ → ψ] = σ , w ∈ σ [ϕ → ψ]. By w ∈ σ [ϕ], w ∈ σ [ϕ][ψ], as desired.
Let us take (1a) as an example. Assume a normal (i.e., non-magical) situation
where acquiring the knowledge that the addressee is thirsty does not determine
whether there is beer in the fridge or not. Thus, the proposition ‘there’s beer in the
fridge’ is independent of ‘you are thirsty’. Now, the speaker uttered the sentence (1a).
Given the d-independence condition and Theorem 1, the consequent proposition
‘there’s beer in the fridge’ is supported. Thus, our condition derives the consequent
entailment in the dynamic framework.
Remark 9. As stressed in section 3.1, our semantics of conditionals is procedural
and stepwise. Kaufmann (2000) reinforces this thesis by reformulating the semantics
of conditionals in terms of the notion of ‘conclude’. More specifically, the final
step of the conditional update is performed by the operation of ‘learning in a state
σ that a state σ ′ supports ϕ’ (notation: σ [σ ′ ` ϕ] in our setting). Furthermore, his
semantic framework centers around a stack model. To see this, we define σ [σ ′ ` ϕ]
as the following:
σ [σ ′ ` ϕ] := {w ∈ σ |w ∈ σ ′ implies w ∈ σ ′[ϕ]} .
As can be seen, σ [ϕ → ψ] = σ [σ [ϕ] ` ψ]. Thus, the update performed by a
conditional ϕ→ ψ is paraphrased as ‘learning in a state σ that a state σ [ϕ] supports
ψ’. In the next section, we consider the notion corresponding to σ [σ ′ ` ϕ] in
partition semantics. In particular, we extract dynamic semantics for conditional
assertions and conditional questions from the work by Isaacs & Rawlins (2008).
4 Biscuit conditional questions
As noted in section 1, there are instances of biscuit conditional questions as in (4),
repeated here as (14). Unlike a canonical conditional question like (6), repeated here
as (15), (14) does entail the question without if -clause, ‘Is there beer in the fridge?’.
(14) If I get thirsty, is there beer in the fridge?
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C0 C1 C2
Figure 2 Structured contexts
(15) If it’s raining, will the fireworks be cancelled?
We extend our dynamic independence to structured contexts to handle biscuit
conditional questions. As before, we stipulate W := {0,1}P, where P is the set of
proposition letters. In dealing with statements and questions, we now introduce
a structured context C as an equivalence relation on some set of possible worlds
(Groenendijk 1999; Isaacs & Rawlins 2008). Each equivalence relation on W gives
us a partition as in Figure 2, where blue lines represent equivalence relations. For
example, all four worlds in the structured context C0 of Figure 2 are indistinguishable,
thus the conversation agents are not aware of the difference from each other. For the
structured context C1 in Figure 2, q-worlds are distinguished from ¬q-worlds but the
agents cannot distinguish, for instance, a p-world w11 from another p-world w01.
We define the set Bool(P) as all the propositional combinations generated from P.
Note that we can calculate the truth value of w(ϕ) for a w ∈W and ϕ ∈ Bool(P).
Now, we define the setQL of query-formulas (see Velissaratou 2000) by:
(16) If ϕ , ψ ∈ Bool(P) then ϕ!, ϕ?, ϕ!→ ψ!, ϕ!→ ψ? are inQL .
Here, ϕ! and ϕ? represent declarative and interrogative sentences, respectively.
Moreover, we regard ϕ!→ ψ!, ϕ!→ ψ? as a declarative conditional and a condi-
tional question, respectively. We denote query-formulas ofQL by α , β , γ , etc. We
employ the syntactic notion of query-formula from Velissaratou (2000), and follow
the central idea of Isaacs & Rawlins (2008), but our semantics is different from the
one defined by Velissaratou (2000). That is, we define the result of updating C with
a query-formula ofQL as follows:
C[ϕ!] := {〈w,v〉 ∈C |w(ϕ) = v(ϕ) = 1}
C[ϕ?] := {〈w,v〉 ∈C |w(ϕ) = v(ϕ)} .
Let us illustrate some simple assertive and inquisitive updates with figures. C2
represents an inquisitive state where the agent does not distinguish w11 from w00, as
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(i) C2 (ii) C2[p!] (iii) C2[q?]
Figure 3 q? is not d-independent from p! in C2
depicted in Figure 3 (i). In Figure 3 (ii), C2 is assertively updated with p, thus the
worlds that make p false are removed. In Figure 3 (iii), C2 is inquisitively updated
with q and the worlds that assign different truth values to q, i.e., w11 and w00, are
disconnected.
Now, based on Isaacs & Rawlins (2008), we define conditional updates as
follows:
Definition 10. Let γ be one of a declarative ψ! or an interrogative ψ?. Then,
C[ϕ!→ γ] :=C[¬ϕ!]∪C[ϕ!][γ]
= {〈w,v〉 ∈C | 〈w,v〉 ∈C[¬ϕ!] or 〈w,v〉 ∈C[ϕ!][γ]}
Remark 11. Isaacs & Rawlins (2008) incorporate Kaufmann’s (2000) stack model
inside the definition of conditionals and conditional questions (see Remark 9).
Instead, our Definition 10 above is defined directly against a structured context. Let
us see whether our Definition 10 still follows from Isaacs and Rawlins’ original
insight. We focus on the generalization of Kaufmann’s (2000) notion of ‘conclude’,
i.e., σ [σ ′ ` ϕ] (‘learning in a state σ that a state σ ′ supports ϕ’) mentioned in
Remark 9. For structured contexts, we may define the operation of ‘learning in a
context C that a context C′ supports γ’ (notation: C[C′ ` γ]) as follows (Isaacs &
Rawlins 2008: 293):
C[C′ ` ϕ] := {〈w,v〉 ∈C |∃z∈W.(〈w,z〉 ∈C′ or 〈z,v〉 ∈C′) implies 〈w,v〉 ∈C′[γ]}.
Let us substitute C′ in C[C′ ` γ] with C[ϕ!], similarly to Remark 9. Then, we obtain
Isaacs and Rawlins’ semantics of conditionals in terms of structured contexts:
C[ϕ!→ γ] = {〈w,v〉 ∈C |∃z∈W.(〈w,z〉 ∈C[ϕ!] or 〈z,v〉 ∈C[ϕ!]) implies 〈w,v〉 ∈C[ϕ!][γ]}
Since 〈w,z〉 ∈C[ϕ!] and 〈z,v〉 ∈C[ϕ!] are equivalent with w(ϕ) = 1 and v(ϕ) = 1
respectively, we may rewrite C[ϕ!→ γ] into:
{〈w,v〉 ∈C |(w(ϕ) = 1 or v(ϕ) = 1) implies 〈w,v〉 ∈C[ϕ!][γ]}
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Moreover, since (w(ϕ) = 1 or v(ϕ) = 1) is equivalent with 〈w,v〉 /∈ C[¬ϕ!], our
simplified semantics of conditionals is successfully derived from Isaacs and Rawlins’
stack-based semantics:7
C[ϕ!→ γ] = {〈w,v〉 ∈C | 〈w,v〉 ∈C[¬ϕ!] or 〈w,v〉 ∈C[ϕ!][γ]}.
Note that both of C[ϕ!→ ψ!] and C[ϕ!→ ψ?] are also structured contexts.8
Let us define the notion of support and consistency also for structured contexts.
(17) C supports α (written: C |= α) if C =C[α].
(18) α is consistent in C if C[α] 6= /0.
For instance, since we know that C2 6= C2[q?] in Figure 3, C2 does not support
the interrogative q?, while updating C2[p!] with q? does not change the partition,
thus C2[p!] supports q?. We note that, given a non-empty structured context C, any
update of C by a question ϕ? is always consistent in C.
As in Kaufmann 2000, we also obtain the following monotonicity result.
Proposition 12. C[α]⊆C for all contexts C and query-formulas α ∈QL .
What is the d-independent condition in this setting? First, let us consider the
independence condition between declarative sentences. One might attempt to replace
an information state σ in Definition 5 with a structured context C to obtain a possible
candidate for the independence condition over structured contexts. However, this
is insufficient, because C[¬ϕ!] = /0 is no longer equivalent to C[ϕ!] = C.9 That is,
now that we have structured contexts, the candidate condition cannot be rewritten
in terms of the notion of support. However, we can still preserve our previous
intuition of independence in dynamic semantics: a query-formula ψ! is independent
of ϕ! in C if updating C with ϕ! or ¬ϕ! does not affect the supportedness and the
consistency of ψ!. Thus, we provide Definition 13 as the notion of independence
for structured contexts. From the condition (ii) of Definition 13, we can obtain the
desired consequent entailment, as is the case with Theorem 1.
7 We owe this simplification of semantics of conditionals in terms of structured contexts to Makoto
Kanazawa (p.c.).
8 Furthermore, perhaps surprisingly, C[p!→ q!] outputs an inquisitive context, although p!→ q!
is a declarative update. Let W = {w11,w10,w01,w00 } and let us take C0 = W ×W from Figure
2, i.e., an ignorant and indifferent structured context. If we update C0 with p!→ q!, C[p!→ q!]
= C0[¬p!]∪C0[p!][q!] becomes an equivalence relation on {w11,w01,w00 } where {w01,w00 } and
{w11 } form equivalence classes. Thus, C[p!→ q!] outputs an inquisitive context.
9 This is because for structured contexts, we cannot maintain the same semantics of negation as
information states. That is, C[¬ϕ!] cannot be defined as C \C[ϕ!] : 〈w,v〉 ∈C[¬ϕ!] iff w(ϕ) = 0 and
v(ϕ) = 0. On the other hand, 〈w,v〉 ∈C\C[ϕ!] iff w(ϕ) = 0 or v(ϕ) = 0. Therefore, there is a critical
difference between ‘and’ and ‘or’.
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Definition 13. ψ! is d-independent of ϕ! in C if, given α’s consistency in C,
(i) C[β ] 6= /0 iff C[α][β ] 6= /0 and
(ii) C |= β iff C[α] |= β ,
for all α ∈ {ϕ!,¬ϕ!} and all β ∈ {ψ!,¬ψ!}.
Theorem 2. Let ψ! be d-independent of ϕ! in C and ϕ! be consistent in C. Then,
C |= ϕ!→ ψ! implies C |= ψ!.
Proof. Assume that C |= ϕ!→ ψ!. That is, C[¬ϕ!]∪C[ϕ!][ψ!] = C. We show
that C[ψ!] = C. By d-independence, it suffices to show C[ϕ!][ψ!] = C[ϕ!], i.e.,
C[ϕ!]⊆C[ϕ!][ψ!] by Proposition 12. Fix any 〈w,v〉 ∈C[ϕ!]. We show that 〈w,v〉 ∈
C[ϕ!][ψ!]. Again by Proposition 12, we note 〈w,v〉 ∈C. So, w(ϕ) = 1 and v(ϕ)
= 1. This implies that 〈w,v〉 /∈C[¬ϕ!]. By C[¬ϕ!]∪C[ϕ!][ψ!] = C, we conclude
〈w,v〉 ∈C[ϕ!][ψ!].
Now let us move to the independence of an interrogative ψ? from a declarative
ϕ! over structured contexts. Basically, we can follow the same idea as in Definition
13 for declarative sentences, but we may simplify the statement of the definition.
First of all, there is no need for us to consider both the case of β is ψ? and the case
of β is ¬ψ? in Definition 13, since C[ψ?] = C[¬ψ?] for all structured contexts C.
Second, the statement corresponding to (i) of Definition 13 always holds under the
assumption of α’s consistency in C, and so the condition would be redundant for
interrogatives. This is because the updates by interrogatives are always meaningful
as we have already mentioned above. In particular, when we assume that α is
consistent in C, we have C 6= /0 and C[α] 6= /0, hence C[ψ?] 6= /0 and C[α][ψ?] 6= /0.
Definition 14. ψ? is d-independent of ϕ! in C if, given α’s consistency in C,
C |= ψ? iff C[α] |= ψ?
for all α ∈ {ϕ!,¬ϕ!}.
To illustrate, let us consider the following examples:
(19) a. q? is d-independent from p! in C1 of Figure 4. This is because an update
by q? gives us a finer partition which allows us to distinguish between q-
worlds and ¬q-worlds, but all three structured contexts in Figure 4 already
distinguish those two ‘zones’. Let us see why via definition. When α is
p!, it suffices to show the equivalence between C1 |= q? and C1[p!] |= q?,
but both of them hold as in Figure 4. Similarly, for the case where α is
¬p!, it is easy to see the equivalence between C1 |= q? and C1[¬p!] |= q?.
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C1 |= q? C1[p!][q?] C1[¬p!][q?]
Figure 4 q? is d-independent from p! in C1
b. q? is not d-independent from p! in C2 of Figure 3. Recall that the structured
context C2 does not support q?, while the updated context C2[p!] by the
declarative p! support q?.
Then, by an argument similar to Theorem 2, we can establish the following:
Theorem 3. Let ψ? be d-independent of ϕ! in C and ϕ! be consistent in C. Then,
C |= ϕ!→ ψ? implies C |= ψ?.
Let us take (1a) and (4) as examples. Assume a similar non-magical situation
where the speaker being thirsty does not determine the presence/absence of drinks in
the fridge. Given the d-independence condition and Theorem 2, both the consequent
declarative ‘there’s beer in the fridge’ and the consequent interrogative ‘is there
anything in the fridge?’ are supported. Thus, our condition derives the consequent
entailment for both biscuit conditional statements and questions in the dynamic
framework.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Summary
We develop a dynamic and non-symmetric version of independence tailored for both
information states and structured contexts. Franke’s proposal is further supported in
that there is no need for stipulating special semantics for biscuit conditionals, since
the “feeling of entailment” of biscuit conditional questions as well as statements can
be derived from the existing dynamic semantics of conditionals and our dynamic
independence.
5.2 Future directions
There are several future directions for research related to this analysis of biscuit
conditionals and the notion of independence. First, the current paper employed
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Groenedijk’s (1999) structured context to characterize conditional questions in truth-
conditional semantics. However, inquisitive semantics developed by Groenendijk
and his colleagues (Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009, among others) enables us
to define the semantics of interrogative sentences in terms of an (unstructured)
information state. In inquisitive semantics, the meaning of a sentence is obtained
by support-conditions. An information state supports an interrogative sentence ?p,
which is equivalent to p∨¬p, if it supports p or ¬p. Thus, it appears to be fruitful
to investigate whether our notion of independence can be extended to inquisitive
semantics. Furthermore, in a recent version of the framework called “Suppositional
Inquisitive Semantics” (Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2013), there is a semantic relation
called dismissing a supposition, which characterizes Isaacs and Rawlins’ (2008)
intuition of ‘denial of the antecedent’, as mentioned in section 3.1.
Second, we restricted our syntax to the propositional level in this paper. Since
there are first-order extensions of dynamic semantics, it would be interesting to see
whether it is possible to extend our idea and analysis to the first-order case where
the property of monotonicity of updates is maintained.
Third, in this paper, we extracted the semantics of conditional declaratives and
interrogatives on structured contexts from the stack model of Isaacs & Rawlins
(2008) and defined the notion of d-independence. Alternatively, we may generalize
our idea of independence to Isaacs and Rawlins’ (2008) original stack model.
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